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I. OPENING DEAL
Those litigating human rights claims in the federal courts of the United
States have had a run of especially good luck of late. The adoption of the
Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA) in 1991,' along with notable victories
in the Marcos cases,2 Paul v. Avril,3 and Taye v. Negewo,4 have galvanized
* Associate Professor of Law, Emory University School of Law. The writer discloses that
he participated as an amicus party in three of the cases discussed in this Essay: Karadzic,
infra note 8 (Brief of Amici Curiae International Human Rights Law Group and International
Law Professors) (2d Cir. 94-9035, filed Jan. 17, 1995); Negewo, infra note 4 (Brief of Amici
Curiae International Human Rights Law Group and International Law Professors) (1 th Cir.
93-9133, filed July 8, 1994); and Princz, infra note 6 (Brief of Amici Curiae of International
Law Professors in Support of a Grant of Certiorari) (U.S. S. Ct. 94-909, filed Jan. 17, 1995).
This essay was revised to reflect developments up to January 1995.
'Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (codified at
28 U.S.C. § 1350(2) (1994)). See also Yoav Gery, Note, The Torture Victim Protection Act:
Raising Issues of Legitimacy, 26 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECoN. 597 (1993); Jennifer
Correale, Comment, The Torture Victim Protection Act: A Vital Contribution to International
Human Rights Enforcement or Just a Nice Gesture?, 6 PACE INT'L L. REV. 197 (1994).
2 The two most relevant decisions in this multi-faceted, multi-district litigation, are In re
Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos Litigation (Trajano v. Marcos), 978 F.2d 493 (9th Cir. 1992),
cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2960 (1993) and In re Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos Litigation
(Hilao v. Marcos), 25 F.3d 1467 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 63 U.S.L.W. 3562 (U.S. Jan.
23, 1995). Other cases, typically involving the Philippine government's attempt to repatriate
the stolen assets of the late ex-President Marcos, include Republic of Philippines v. Marcos,
806 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1048 (1987) [hereinafter "Marcos (2d
Cir.)"]; Republic of Phil. v. Marcos, 862 F.2d 1355 (9th Cir. 1988) (en banc panel), cert.
denied, 490 U.S. 1035 (1989) [hereinafter "Marcos (9th Cir.)"].
See also Ellen L. Lutz, The Marcos Human Rights Litigation: Can Justice Be Achieved
in U.S. Courts for Abuses that Occurred Abroad?, 14 BOST. COL. THIRD WORLD L.J. 43
(1994); Joan Fitzpatrick, The Future of the Alien Tort Claims Act: Lessons from In re Marcos
Human Rights Litigation, 64 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 491 (1993).
3 812 F. Supp. 207 (S.D. Fla. 1993).
" No. 1:90-cv-2010-GET (N.D. Ga. Aug. 2, 1993) (Memorandum and Order; Entry of
Judgment), on appeal, Docket No. 91-9133 (11th Cir.).
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the human rights advocacy community here. There have been some
setbacks, for sure. The outcomes in Siderman de Blake v. Argentina,5
Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany,6 and Lafontant v. Aristide7 can
probably be considered mixed. The results in such cases as Doe I v.
Karadzic,8 and, even more especially, the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in
Saudi Arabia v. Nelson9 are unambiguously bad.
Nevertheless, it seems we have finally entered a period of authentic
success. Many shared such optimism when the Second Circuit's decision in
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala ° was handed down in 1980. That case may well
be regarded as opening the epic period of human rights litigation in this
country. The successful revivication of the Alien Tort Claims Act
(ATCA)," and its enlistment in the service of those who would use it to
vindicate international standards of humanity and decency, was surely
remarkable. In a sense, all current human rights litigation owes its fortune
to Filartiga. The rediscovery of the Alien Tort Statute was much like
finding the Holy Grail.
But events moved quickly to rob human rights litigators of the sweet taste
of success. There were notable cases in which the ambit of the ATCA was
'965 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1812 (1993).
6 813 F. Supp. 22 (D.D.C. 1992), rev'd, 26 F.3d 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115
S. Ct. 923 (1995). For an update on developments, see Eva M. Rodriguez, Germans Still
Cool to Princz Claim, 16 LEGAL TIMES OF WASH. (No. 39) 16 (Feb. 14, 1994); Federal
Court Watch: Survivor Can't Sue Germany, id at 6 (July 11, 1994). See also Comment,
D.C. Circuit Holds that Violation of Peremptory Norms of International Law Does Not
Constitute an Implied Waiver of Sovereign Immunity Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act-Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 108 HARv. L. REv. 513 (1994).
7 844 F. Supp. 128 (E.D.N.Y. 1994).
8 866 F. Supp. 734 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), on appeal, Docket No. 94-9035 (2d Cir.). For more
on this litigation, see Fitzpatrick, supra note 2, at 517-20. See also Denegri v. Republic of
Chile, 1992 WL 91914 (D.D.C. 1992).
' 113 S. Ct. 1471 (1993).
'0 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
" 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994) ("The District Courts shall have original jurisdiction of any
civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty
of the United States."). For more on the historical background of the statute, see Ane-Marie
Burley, The Alien Tort Statute and the Judiciary Act of 1789: A Badge of Honor, 83 AM. J.
INT'L L. 461 (1989); Jean-Marie Simon, The Alien Tort Claims Act: Justice or Show Trials?,
11 BosT. U. INT'L L.J. 1 (1993).
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thoughtlessly and needlessly narrowed. 12 Even more devastating was the
United States Supreme Court's opinion in Argentine Republic v. Amerada
Hess, 3 where the Court clearly ruled that the ATCA did not vest federal
courts with subject-matter jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns. 4 Only the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) 5 could, and the narrowly drawn
exceptions to the presumptive immunity of the foreign sovereign were not
satisfied in that case. 6 Nor were they to be fulfilled in any other case
where the cause of action sounded in a tort violating the customary
international law of human rights. In short, Amerada Hess foreclosed suits
against foreign sovereigns for their human rights abuses. Until the recent
string of strong hands, litigators were forced to be content to proceed against
the minions and lackeys of foreign governments: free-lance torturers, war
criminals, and exploiters. So, as we all know, our enthusiasm in 1980 was
unwarranted. It may be now, too, and this article suggests that we could
soon again become victims of our own prosperity.
I believe that the essence of the problem of litigating international human
rights claims in U.S. courts is foreign sovereign immunity. The doctrine-as
largely codified in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act-is implicated in
two fundamental ways in all such litigation. The first is whenever an
individual defendant attempts to seek immunity under the FSIA by arguing
that his or her actions were really those of a foreign sovereign. The result
of such a tactic, if successful, would be to require human rights plaintiffs to
show that their cause of action arises under one of the enumerated exceptions
within the statutory scheme of the FSIA.17 We know from the Amerada
Hess decision that this may well be an impossible task.
12 See e.g., Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985) (particularly Judge Bork's opinion in that case). See 726 F.2d
at 798, 810-19.
" 488 U.S. 428 (1989).
14 See id at 435-39.
15 Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 90 Stat. 2891 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§
1330, 1332, 1391, 1441 1602-11 (1988)).
nAmerada Hess, 488 U.S. at 439-43.
17 There are five enumerated exceptions to the presumptive immunity of a foreign
sovereign. They are detailed at 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a). The commercial activity (§ 1605(a)(2))
and property expropriation (§ 1605(a)(3)) exceptions are unlikely to be applicable in most
human rights litigation. But see Siderman, 965 F.2d at 708-11. The tort exception of the
FSIA (§ 1605(a)(5)) is inapplicable by its very terms: the tort must occur in the United
States. The waiver exception (§ 1605(a)(1)) is promising, and will be considered below. See
infra notes 74-98 and accompanying text.
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This leads to the second implication of foreign sovereign immunity.
Assuming that a suit is brought directly against a foreign sovereign, or
derivatively by virtue of a court's finding that the private actor was engaged
in a public act, one can wonder if there are any novel avenues for getting
around the FSIA's immunity roadblock. Just as significantly, one must
speculate whether the development of an implied waiver exception to the
FSIA, premised on a defendant actor's violation of a jus cogens norm of
customary international law, may not, in fact, cause substantial mischief. I
am afraid it could be a joker in the deck.
I hope here to reshuffle our understanding of the relationship between
statutory grants of subject-matter jurisdiction, foreign sovereign immunities,
and the prudential doctrines of Act of State and forum non conveniens.
There has been a lawyerly tendency to classify these concerns into separate
doctrinal compartments. After all, if we do not oblige with such an
approach, the judges surely will. Disaggregating, for example, foreign
sovereign immunities from the Act of State doctrine has been a useful
maneuver for human rights litigators. Likewise, drafting complaints invoking
distinct jurisdictional bases has been successful. These approaches may
continue to be workable, but a warning is sounded here of the potential
dangers of failing to see beyond the next hand to be dealt. I truly believe
that we are embarking on a new era in human rights litigation in this
country. We need, therefore, to look ahead and see the potential pitfalls and
trapdoors that await us. There are plenty of them, and for those serious
about the progressive development of the law in this area we had best be
prepared to make some tough bets. Litigation strategies that seem easy and
expedient today could, I suggest, prove disastrous tomorrow.
II. ANTE-UP: PRIVATE ACTORS, PUBLIC ACTS
One kind of bad hand that could be dealt to a human rights litigant is to
sue a defendant who then claims that their actions were really those of a
foreign government. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act takes great
pains to define those entities that are "foreign state[s]" and thus worthy of
presumptive immunity in the courts of the United States. For starters, "A
'foreign state' . . . includes a political subdivision of a foreign state or an
agency or instrumentality of a foreign state."'" So far, so good, but there
is no mention here whether an individual could be deemed to be a foreign
'" 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a) (1994).
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state for purposes of invoking sovereign immunity. The Act does thought-
fully provide an exquisitely sophisticated definition of an "agency or
instrumentality of a foreign state." To qualify as such, an entity must satisfy
all three stated criterion: (1) it must be a separate "legal person, corporate or
otherwise;" (2) it must be an organ of a foreign state or political subdivision
thereof, or have a majority of its shares owned by a foreign state or
subdivision; and (3) it must not be a citizen of the United States, "nor
created under the laws of any third country."' 9  Quite obviously, this
definition was intended to cover business associations, not individuals.'
Indeed, one commentator has suggested that "agency or instrumentality"
"does not include natural persons acting as agents of a foreign state.'
The case law has, however, held differently. One court did grasp the
significance of section 1603(b)(1)'s referral only to "legal person[s]," and
thus ruled that individuals could not claim immunity under the FSIA.'
Another opinion focused on corollary language (found in the FSIA's tortious
act exception) referring to "any official or employee of that foreign state
while acting within the scope of his office or employment, ' 23 in order to
hold that the drafters of the Act clearly intended that individual defendants
could be cloaked by foreign sovereign immunity.' The remainder of the
decisions, though, credit the wider intent of Congress in extending immuni-
ties to foreign sovereigns, and ruled that such an intent for the FSIA would
be frustrated if the protections of the Act were not granted to individuals in
appropriate circumstances.'
"Id. § 1603(b).
o See Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, H.R. Rep. No. 94-1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.,
reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 6604, 6614 [hereinafter "FSIA HOUSE
REPORT"].
21 JOSEPH W. DELLAPENNA, SUING FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS AND THEIR CORPoRATIONS
25 (1988).
22 See Republic of Phil. v. Marcos, 665 F. Supp. 793, 797 (N.D. Cal. 1987) [hereinafter
"Marcos (N.D. Cal.)"]. The District Court in Marcos said that "the statute is not intended
to apply to natural persons, except perhaps to the extent that they may personify a sovereign.
Even then, it appears that the FSIA was not intended to apply to individual sovereigns, but
rather that they would be covered by the separate head-of-state doctrine." Id. (citing FSIA
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 20, at 6613-14, 6619).
23 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5) (1994).
' Liu v. Republic of China, 892 F.2d 1419, 1425 (9th Cir. 1989).
2 See, e.g., Kline v. Kaneko, 685 F. Supp. 386, 389 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) ("The FSIA does
apply to individual defendants when they are sued in their official capacity."); American
Bonded Warehouse Corp. v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 653 F. Supp. 861, 863 (N.D.
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Any real doubts as to whether individuals are notionally covered by the
FSIA were resolved by the Ninth Circuit's decision in Chuidian v. Philippine
National Bank.2 In this case, the gravamen of which was the wrongful
dishonor of a letter of credit, a duly appointed member of President Corazon
Aquino's Good Government Commission ordered the action taken against the
plaintiff." The Commissioner was sued personally; he answered that he
was immune under the FSIA. The plaintiff vigorously contested this point,
and, somewhat surprisingly, the United States government weighed in with
a "Statement of Interest" indicating that while the defendant was not covered
by the FSIA, he was immune under common law principles of foreign
sovereign immunity.' The Ninth Circuit, in any event, found the language
of FSIA section 1603(b) ambiguous, noting that "[w]hile [it] may not
explicitly include individuals within its definition of foreign instrumentalities,
neither does it expressly exclude them."29  Drawing solace from state
qualified immunity jurisprudence, the Chuidian court ° said that
we cannot infer that Congress ... intended to allow unre-
stricted suits against individual foreign officials acting in
their official capacities. Such a result would amount to a
blanket abrogation of foreign sovereign immunity by
allowing litigants to accomplish indirectly what the Act
barred them from doing directly. It would be illogical to
conclude that Congress would have enacted such a sweeping
alteration of existing law implicitly and without comment.
The Ninth Circuit likewise made short work of the government's contention
that individual immunities were subject to the common law residuum of
111. 1987); Rios v. Marshall, 530 F. Supp. 351, 371 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (an individual "sued in
his official capacity as [an] agent of the instrumentality,. . . is equally protected by principles
of foreign sovereign immunity."); Mueller v. Diggelman, No. 82 CIV 5513 (S.D.N.Y. 1983)
(LEXIS, Genfed Library, District Court file).
2 912 F.2d 1095 (9th Cir. 1990).
2 id. at 1097-98.
2aId. at 1099, 1101.
29 Id. at 1101.
30 Id at 1101-02 (citing Monell v. Dep't of Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.55 (1978);
Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. Cal. State Bd. of Equalization, 858 F.2d 1376, 1382 n.5
(9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1006 (1989)).
31 Chuidian, 912 F.2d at 1102.
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foreign sovereign immunity. The court clearly saw this as an attempt to
revive the practice of individual State Department determinations for such
cases. The Ninth Circuit was not inclined to do so, preferring at least to
embrace the idea that the FSIA codified in 1976 nearly the entire field of
foreign sovereign immunity law.32 Courts following Chuidian have simply
assumed that the FSIA can apply to individual actors.33 This question
appears closed.'
All this begs the question of when precisely will an individual's actions
be attributed to a foreign sovereign in order to grant immunity. The only
court to articulate an intelligible test of attribution has been the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals.35 In its 1992 Trajano opinion, that court affirmed and
summarized its earlier holding in Chuidian, pronouncing this standard:
[T]he FSIA covers a foreign official acting in an official
capacity, but that official is not entitled to immunity for acts
which are not committed in an official capacity (such as
selling personal property), and for acts beyond the scope of
her authority (for example, doing something the sovereign
has not empowered the official to do).36
32 See id. at 1102-03.
33 See, e.g., Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc. v. Comm. of Receivers for A.W.
Galadari, 810 F. Supp. 1375, 1381 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other grounds, 12 F.3d 317 (2d Cir.
1993); Refco, Inc. v. Galadari, 755 F. Supp. 79, 82 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
' Amicus parties in Trajano, including Human Rights Watch, the Lowenstein Human
Rights Clinic, and the Center for Constitutional Rights, attempted to reargue the point that the
FSIA was inapplicable to individuals. The Court brushed aside the submission as "foreclosed
by Chuidian." See 978 F.2d at 495, 497 n.8.
35 Other courts have as much as said that the issue is largely a factual one. See Gilson
v. Republic of Ir., 682 F.2d 1022, 1029 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Skeen v. Federative Republic of
Braz., 566 F. Supp. 1414, 1418 (D.D.C. 1983). See also FSIA HOUSE REPORT, supra note
20, at 6619.
Alternatively, "in determining whether an entity is entitled to claim the protection of the
FSIA, courts have accorded great weight to the statements of foreign officials." Kline, 685
F. Supp. at 390 & n.2.
Lastly, Skeen did suggest that when the suit was against an officer or employee of a foreign
state the test of attribution would be broadened to include both acts or omissions ordered at
higher levels of state authority, or those actions designed to further the state's interests. 566
F. Supp. at 1418-19. See also DELLAPENNA, supra note 21, at 185-87.
3 Trajano, 978 F.2d at 497 (citing Chuidian, 912 F.2d at 1106).
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But how did the Chuidian panel formulate this two prong test, emphasizing
both official capacity and scope of authority? What few have noticed is that
the Ninth Circuit has, in essence, imported domestic notions of respondeat
superior in sovereign immunity claims, and applied them to the FSIA. One
might suggest those notions were derived from the parallel provision of the
FSIA covering tortious acts, since that clause does refer to an "official or
employee of [a] foreign state while acting within the scope of his office or
employment."37 That provision of the FSIA is substantially identical to
language in the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA),38 the sole avenue by
which individuals may sue the U.S. government in tort. Indeed, the
Chuidian decision is explicit in its reliance on cases construing the FTCA in
circumstances where individual government employees have been sued.39
But the FSIA also provides a "discretionary function" limitation to this
tortious acts exception. Even if a foreign sovereign is responsible for a tort
occurring in the United States under this exception, immunity will still attach
to "any claim based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to
exercise or perform a discretionary function regardless of whether the
discretion be abused."' Cases like De Letelier v. Chile41 and Liu v.
Republic of China42 clearly say that a foreign sovereign has no discretion
to carry out certain acts (like political assassination) within the United States
that are illegal under U.S. or international law.43 Other cases are more
37 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5) (1994).
' The Federal Tort Claims Act, June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 933 (1948) (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1994)).
3 See Chuidian, 912 F.2d at 1106 (citing and quoting Larson v. Domestic and Foreign
Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 689 (1949); United States v. Yakima Tribal Court, 806 F.2d
853, 859 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1069 (1987)). For other such cases, see
Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979); Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609 (1963). See also The
Westfall Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d) (1994).
40 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5)(A) (1994).
4' 488 F. Supp. 665 (D.D.C. 1980).
42 642 F. Supp. 297 (N.D. Cal. 1986), rev'd on other grounds, 892 F.2d 1419 (9th Cir.
1989).
4' De Letelier, 488 F. Supp. at 673; Liu, 642 F. Supp. at 304-05. Interestingly, Judge
Green in De Letelier relied on precedents construing the FTCA's corollary "discretionary
function" exception. See 488 F. Supp. at 673 (citing Hatahley v. United States, 351 U.S. 173,
181 (1956); Cruikshank v. United States, 431 F. Supp. 1355, 1359 (D. Haw. 1977)). See also
Comment, Illegal Acts and the Discretionary Function Exception of the Federal Tort Claims
Act, 1978 B.Y.U. L. REv. 355.
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equivocal for conduct falling far short in consequence.' These discretion-
ary function cases seem to be saying that while certain individual conduct
may be attributed as public acts of a state, they do not qualify as a sovereign
act for purposes of granting immunity.' Courts seem, therefore, willing to
develop an exception to foreign sovereign immunity for manifestly illegal
acts carried out in this country. But it might be wondered whether the
FSIA's discretionary function jurisprudence is useful in establishing limits
on an individual's ability to attribute his conduct to a foreign sovereign,
when those acts are carried out in the foreign sovereign's territory.
This jurisprudential sleight-of-hand would not be troubling but for the fact
that it appears to have been utterly unintended. How can a court apply a
consistent standard of imputing private acts to foreign sovereigns, when the
standard developed seems to be conditioned on peculiarly domestic
expectations as to the relationship between government and its officials? As
has already been suggested, much turns on this point. If the standard of
attribution is construed liberally, more individual conduct will be covered by
the FSIA, and thus fewer cases will likely clear the Act's presumptive grant
of immunity.
Consider now the handful of cases where a determination was made
whether, in fact, an individual defendant's act was sovereign in character.
Chuidian, the well-spring of this stream of cases, is quite straightforward.
The Ninth Circuit simply concluded, with virtually no discussion, that the
defendant committed acts "in his official capacity as a member of the
[Philippine's Good Government] Commission." In Trajano, the Ninth
Circuit resolved the problem of Imee Marcos-Manotoc's claim that she was
immune from charges that she caused the wrongful death of plaintiffs
decedent by simply saying that in failing to make an appearance before the
4See, e.g., Joseph v. Office of Consulate Gen. of Nig., 830 F.2d 1018, 1025 (9th Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 905 (1988) (gratuitous damage to consular residence was within
scope of consular officials' duties; no immunity); Risk v. Halvorsen, 936 F.2d 393, 395 (9th
Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 880 (1992) (consular officials' aid to Norwegian national
in evading a state court child custody order was within discretion of foreign government;
immunity granted).
4 See Adam C. Belsky et al., Comment, Implied Waiver Under the FSIA: A Proposed
Exception to Immunity for Violations of Peremptory Norms of International Law, 77 CAL. L.
REV. 365, 399-401 (1989) [hereinafter "California Comment']. For the difficult choice-of-law
problems inherent in these cases, read Liu, 892 F.2d at 1425-26 (applying California's rules
of respondeat superior in attributing assassin's conduct to foreign sovereign).
46 Chuidian, 912 F.2d at 1103.
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district court, and thus defaulting, she "admitted acting on her own authority,
not on the authority of the Republic of the Philippines."4 The Court did
add that "her acts cannot have been taken within any official mandate and
therefore cannot have been acts of an agent or instrumentality of a foreign
state within the meaning of the FSIA."4'
But what really tipped the scales against Marcos-Manotoc's argument (that
her acts were covered by the FSIA) was the Ninth Circuit's reliance on its
1989 decision49 that the Act of State doctrine was unavailable to protect ex-
President Ferdinand Marcos from the same charges of planning Trajano's
murder. The later panel of the Ninth Circuit noted that "[iun so holding, we
implicitly rejected the possibility that the acts set out in Trajano's complaint
were public acts of the sovereign." 5 Although the Act of State doctrine is
analytically distinct from any determination of jurisdiction under the FSIA,
as the Ninth Circuit has made clear in other cases,5' it seems to play a role
in the process of attributing private acts to foreign sovereigns. The Trajano
opinion certainly suggests that if an act is characterized as "official" and
"public" the Act of State doctrine might be available on the merits to block
consideration of the case.52 If the Act of State doctrine's definition of
public acts is wider than that suggested above for the FSIA, this might result
in more cases being dismissed. To date, this has not been a real concern; in
every instance where a defendant in a human rights case has raised an Act
of State defense, it has been rejected. 3
47 Trajano, 978 F.2d at 498.
Id. See also Hilao, 25 F.3d at 1470-71 (for same analysis).
4 Trajano v. Marcos, 878 F.2d 1439 (9th Cir. 1989).
50 Trajano, 978 F.2d at 498 & n.10.
S See Marcos (9th Cir.), 862 F.2d at 1360-61, 1368-71 (Schroeder, J., dissenting) (en
banc panel).
52 For more on the policy rationale of applying the Act of State doctrine in human rights
litigation, see the different opinions in Marcos, 818 F.2d 1473, 1482-85 (Kozinski, J.), 1492-
95 (Nelson, J., dissenting) (9th Cir. 1987), vacated by en banc panel, 862 F.2d 1355 (9th Cir.
1988). See also Marcos (2d Cir. 1986), 806 F.2d at 357-59. For the modem contours of the
doctrine, see W.S. Kirkatrick & Co. v. Envtl. Tectonics Corp., 493 U.S. 400 (1990); Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
" See, e.g., Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 889 (Act of State defense rejected in dicta: "[We
doubt whether action by a state official in violation of the Constitution and laws of the
Republic of Paraguay, and wholly unratified by that nation's government, could properly be
characterized as an act of state."); Jimenez v. Aristeguieta, 311 F.2d 547, 557 (5th Cir. 1962)
("It is only when officials having sovereign authority act in an official capacity that the Act
of State Doctrine applies."), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 914 (1963); Paul v. Avril, 812 F. Supp.
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But there is a danger lurking here, and its origins can be traced back to
unfortunate language in Filartiga. In what he acknowledged to be dicta,
Judge Kaufman said
[W]e doubt whether action by a state official in violation of
the Constitution and laws of the Republic of Paraguay, and
wholly unratified by that nation's government, could
properly be characterized as an act of state. Paraguay's
renunciation of torture as a legitimate instrument of state
policy, however, does not strip the tort of its character as an
international law violation, if in fact it occurred under color
of government authority.'
There is some cognitive dissonance in this statement, for Judge Kaufman was
valiantly attempting to reconcile two contradictory assertions. On the one
hand, he had to defeat a putative Act of State defense by disclaiming that the
torture carried out by the defendant was, indeed, a public act. But he also
had to maintain the cause of action as arising under the Alien Tort Statute,
and to do that he had to vindicate its "international" character, and thus
preserve some fiction of attribution to a sovereign power. Filartiga resolves
this conflict in a similar manner as the discretionary function cases. While
Judge Kaufman sees "public acts" as distinct from those "occurring under
color of governmental authority," the jurisprudence under FSIA section
1605(a)(5)(A) distinguishes "public acts" from "sovereign acts."
Filartiga's different treatment of public acts and those occurring under
color of governmental authority was perpetuated in Trajano, when the Ninth
Circuit noted that "only individuals who have acted under official authority
or under color of such authority may violate international law. 55 It seems
obvious that Judge Rymer in Trajano came upon the same problem as Judge
Kaufman in Filartiga. The Trajano opinion recognizes precisely the same
dilemma, and embraces the exact same solution:
at 212 ("The acts as alleged in the complaint [torture and extrajudicial killing], if true would
hardly qualify as official public acts."). But cf Marcos, 818 F.2d 1473 (9th Cir. 1987)
(Kozinski, J.), vacated by en banc panel, 862 F.2d 1355 (9th Cir. 1988).
' 630 F.2d at 889 (citations omitted).
55 978 F.2d at 501-02 (citing Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 791-95 (Edwards, J., concurring)).
See also Hilao, 25 F.3d at 1470-71.
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Although Marcos-Manotoc's default concedes that she
controlled the military intelligence personnel who tortured
and murdered Trajano, and in turn that she was acting under
color of the martial law declared by then-President Marcos,
we have concluded that her actions were not those of the
Republic of the Philippines for purposes of sovereign
immunity under Chuidian.56
While I believe there is not much to the differentiation articulated in the
discretionary function cases, I see terrific trouble in the "under color of
governmental authority" test applied in Trajano. For starters, the formulation
itself arises from a peculiarly domestic preoccupation with Fourteenth
Amendment jurisprudence and the problem of qualified immunity for state
actors.57 If it has any international origins, they can be traced through
Filartiga to Jimenez v. Aristeguieta" and thence to an antique and obscure
provision of the federal Habeas statute which extends the Writ to citizens
and residents of a foreign state "in custody for an act done or omitted under
any alleged right, title, authority, privilege, protection, or exemption claimed
under the commission, order or sanction of any foreign state, or under color
thereof, the validity and effect of which depend upon the law of nations. 59
This is a thin reed to support a novel theory of attribution.
This facile technique for evading the FSIA while, at the same time,
maintaining jurisdiction under the Alien Tort Claims Act, may backfire-and
badly. The U.S. Supreme Court recently cautioned in the Nelson case that
broad ambits were to be given to "sovereign" conduct and foreign sovereign
immunity was not to be lightly excepted for such actions. Justice Souter,
writing for the Court, said:
- Trajano, 978 F.2d at 502. See also Fitzpatrick, supra note 2, at 503-11.
57 See supra note 30 and accompanying text. For further details on the qualified
immunity doctrine, see Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982), which enunciates this
standard: "government officials performing discretionary functions, generally are shielded
from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Id. at
818.
58 311 F.2d 547, 557 (5th Cir. 1962).
59 Act of Aug. 29, 1842, ch. 257, 5 Stat. 539 (1842), (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(4))
(emphasis added). For more on the legislative history of this act, see David J. Bederman, The
Cautionary Tale of Alexander McLeod: Superior Orders and the American Writ of Habeas
Corpus, 41 EMORY L. J. 515, 526-30 (1992).
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[T]he intentional conduct alleged here (the Saudi govern-
ment's wrongful arrest, imprisonment, and torture of Nelson)
could not qualify as commercial under the restrictive theory.
The conduct boils down to abuse of the power of its police
by the Saudi Government, and however monstrous such
abuse undoubtedly may be, a foreign state's exercise of the
power of its police has long been understood for purposes
of the restrictive theory [of foreign sovereign immunity] as
peculiarly sovereign in nature.'
An advocate may be tempted to distinguish Nelson since it was brought
under the commercial activity exception in the FSIA. But I think that would
be foolish, and, absent some reversal on the part of the Supreme Court of the
principle enunciated in Nelson, human rights advocates had best think of
arguments to defeat renewed claims by individual defendants that their
conduct is covered by the presumptive immunity of the FSIA. The
distinction offered by Filartiga and Trajano-that while the individual's
conduct was not attributable to the sovereign, it still violates international
law-may simply be untenable.
And if this were not enough, the provisions of the new Torture Victim
Protection Act will also bear on the problem of imputability of individual
conduct. The TVPA extends to defendants acting "under actual or apparent
authority, or color of law, of any foreign nation."61 This was obviously
drafted expansively to apply to as broad a class of defendants as possible.
But if the TVPA's formulation is used for other individuals, performing
conduct not covered by the TVPA, it will mean that those defendants would,
by analogy, be covered by § 1603 of the FSIA. Although Congress probably
did not intend that the quoted provision of the TVPA be regarded as the
proper standard for this question,62 this may well become judicial practice.
60 113 S. Ct. at 1479 (1993) (citations omitted). See also Cicippio v. Islamic Republic
of Iran, 30 F.3d 164 (D.C. Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 726 (1995).
61 Torture Victim Protection Act, § 2(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1350(2)(a) (1994). The TVPA does,
however, limit this formulation in cases involving "extrajudicial killings." Such conduct, even
if it satisfies section 2(a), is not covered under the Act if "the killing, under international law,
is lawfully carried out under the authority of a foreign nation." Id. § 3(a).
6 See SENATE CoMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, TORTURE VICTIM PROTECTION ACT OF 1991,
S. REP. No. 249, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) [hereinafter "TVPA SENATE REPORT"]; HOUSE
Comm. ON THE JUDICIARY, TORTURE VICTIM PROTECTION AT OF 1991, H.R. REP. No. 367,
102d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1 (1991) [hereinafter "TVPA HOUSE REPORT"].
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Consider the discussion in Lafontant v. Aristide,6a in which Judge Weinstein
considered whether Trajano, when read with the TVPA, would widen the
scope of an individual's FSIA immunity. "[The [Trajano] court," he wrote,
"indicated that the TVPA applies to individuals while the FSIA applies to
states and state actors, [so] the TVPA will only apply to state actors when
they act in their individual capacity .. . .." This does not address the
problem of human rights actions, other than torture and extrajudicial killings,
brought under the ATCA. Will such claims be subject to a broader test for
attribution? If so, defendants in such cases will claim the benefits of the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.
The District Court's discussion of these questions in Doe I v. Karadzic,
was particularly devastating. The defendant in that case was the president
of the self-proclaimed Bosnian-Serb state, an entity unrecognized by the
United States although possessing probable de facto status. Judge Leisure
ruled that the plaintiffs claims for torture, murder, and mass rape could not
be sustained under the ATCA because there was no essential showing that
the defendant was a recognized State actor, making his conduct an offense
under the law of nations.66 Likewise, the TVPA "requires a plaintiffs
claim for relief to be based on actions taken under color of law of any
foreign nation."
67
Individual defendants will certainly find solace in these recent develop-
ments. Since it seems undoubted that individuals may seek the protection
of the FSIA, the only bar to this litigation tactic is to somehow formulate a
standard that excludes human rights abuses from the ambit of a foreign
sovereign's public acts, without, at the same time, divesting the court of its
63 844 F. Supp. 128 (E.D.N.Y. 1994).
" Id. at 131 (citing Trajano, 978 F.2d at 497). Judge Weinstein seemed also to be relying
on the legislative history of the TVPA SENATE REPORT, supra note 62, which contemplated
this issue: "To avoid liability by invoking the FSIA, a former official would have to prove
an agency relationship to a state, which would require that the state 'admit some knowledge
or authorization of the relevant acts.' 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b). Because all states are officially
opposed to torture and extrajudicial killing, however, the FSIA should normally provide no
defense to an action against the TVPA against a former official." Ii. at 8.
What is curious in this passage, however is that the Senate Committee cites to language in
the FSIA (§ 1603(b)) that does not exist. If the standard were "knowledge or authorization"
it would be easier to rebut defendants' claims that they were covered under the FSIA.
65 See 866 F. Supp. at 738-42.
6 See id at 739-40 (relying chiefly on Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 776 (Edwards, J.), and
Carmichael v. United Technologies Corp., 835 F.2d 109, 113-14 (5th Cir. 1988)).
67 Id at 742 (emphasis added).
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jurisdiction under the Alien Tort Statute. This will particularly effect more
novel human rights claims, including arbitrary and prolonged detention. If
a court were, for example, to find that such incarceration violated the law of
nations for the purposes of the ATCA, it would, as Judge Kaufman said in
Filartiga, have to be carried out under color of governmental authority. The
defendant would then surely contend that she was carrying out an official
function within the scope of her employment, the very standard of Chuidian
and Trajano. One solution would be to duck back into domestic law, using
the choice of law cue in Liu v. Republic of China,68 and apply home-grown
rules of attribution. But what works for torts occurring in the United States
may not really persuade for human rights abuses elsewhere.
Another solution to this conundrum-how to impute conduct to a foreign
sovereign (the jurisdictional predicate of the ATCA) without invoking the
presumptive immunity of the FSIA-lies, I believe, in international standards
of attribution. To date, no human rights litigation has resorted to the
standard rules of attribution developed in the law of State responsibility.
6 9
There is, of course, lawyerly and judicial reluctance to rely upon such
authority. But the adoption of the TVPA provides some encouragement,
with its limiting provision that extrajudicial killings, otherwise covered, will
be non-actionable if "the killing, under international law, is lawfully carried
out under the authority of a foreign nation."7° Since the TVPA and ATCA
explicitly make international law the rule of decision, why not have that law
adopted in satisfying a court that the individual actor's conduct is imputable
to the foreign sovereign?7" This will avoid reliance on the terms of the
" 892 F.2d at 1425-26 (applying California's rules of respondeat superior in attributing
assassin's conduct to foreign sovereign). See also Skeen, 566 F. Supp. at 1417-18 (District
of Columbia's rules of respondeat superior applied). This issue was obliquely addressed in
Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 1994 U.S. Dist. Lexis 4718 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 11, 1994).
6 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 207 (1987); IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 446-52 (4th ed.
1990).
0 Torture Victim Protection Act, § 3(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1350(3)(a) (1994) (emphasis added).
7 This approach seems to be validated in the TVPA SENATE REPORT, supra note 62, at
8-9. For more on it, see C.A. Whomersley, Some Reflections on the Immunity of Individuals
for Official Acts, 41 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 848 (1992).
On a related point, it might be possible for a foreign sovereign to waive the immunity of
an individual defendant seeking to claim the benefits of the FSIA in a human rights action.
This has happened once in Paul v. Avril, 812 F. Supp. at 210-11. This will be considered
below in the discussion of head-of-state immunity. See infra notes 140-50 and accompanying
text.
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FSIA to provide such a connection, while also eluding the artificial,
judicially-created distinctions of "public act"/"sovereign act" and "public
act"/"under color of governmental authority." But it may be too late to deal
a new hand in this regard. Attribution jurisprudence under the FSIA has
already been too heavily influenced by what may be inappropriate domestic
analogues.
III. BLUFF AND RAISE: A Jus COGENS EXCEPTION TO THE FSIA
If a suit is brought directly against a foreign sovereign, or derivatively by
virtue of a court's finding that the private actor was engaged in a public act,
then it will become necessary to bring the case within one of the statutorily-
defined exceptions within the FSIA, as the Supreme Court ruled in Amerada
Hess.72  This is no easy task. Indeed, in a typical human rights case,
alleging tortious acts occurring within a foreign country, no exception is
readily available.73 But litigants have recently suggested a number of novel
avenues for getting around the FSIA's immunity roadblock.
The first of these strategies to be employed was arguing that a foreign
sovereign's violation of human rights norms, as contained in international
conventions to which the United States was a party in 1976, creates an
exception under the FSIA's section 1604 or acts as an express waiver under
section 1605(a)(1). 74 This contention figured prominently in Amerada Hess
and the Supreme Court took pains there to indicate that a foreign nation does
not "waive its immunity under [the Act] by signing an international
agreement that contains no mention of a waiver of immunity to suit in the
United States courts or even the availability of a cause of action in the
United States. 75 The Supreme Court cited to the FSIA's legislative history
for the proposition that § 1604 applies only to those international agreements
72 See 488 U.S. at 435-39.
73 See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
74 28 U.S.C. § 1604 ("Subject to existing international agreements to which the United
States is a party at the time of enactment of this Act a foreign state shall be immune from the
jurisdiction of the courts of the United States ...."); § 1605(a)(1) (where "the foreign state
has waived its immunity either explicitly or by implication .... ).
75 488 U.S. at 442-43. The Court proceeded to reject the applicability of the Geneva
Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200; the Pan-
American Maritime Neutrality Convention, Feb. 20, 1928, 47 Stat. 1989, T.S. No. 845; and
the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Aug. 8, 1938, United States-Liberia, 54
Stat. 1739, T.S. No. 956.
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which "expressly conflic[t]" with the immunity provisions of the FSIA,76
and specially mentioning Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs) and
Friendship, Commerce and Navigation (FCN) Treaties." Other courts have
narrowly construed the applicable treaties referenced in § 1604 to include
just a handful of instruments.7 8
Variations on this argument were renewed in Denegri79 and Siderman de
Blake,80 and rejected in both cases. The District Court in Denegri summari-
ly noted that the plaintiffs were relying on such instruments as the United
Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Internation-
al Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the Torture Convention, none
of which "set[s] forth a cause of action against foreign nations in United
States courts, nor do they provide for a waiver of immunity to suit in the
United States."81  The Ninth Circuit's discussion in Siderman was fuller,
and just as conclusive, on this point. The Ninth Circuit pointed out that for
an "international agreement" to be relevant, for purposes of section 1604, it
must have been (1) in force before 1976 (the adoption of the FSIA) for the
United States,82 (2) be an international agreement "enforceable... between
the United States and other foreign states or international organizations,"83
(3) the relevant provisions of which must be self-executing,8' and (4)
76 488 U.S. at 442-43 (citing FSIA HOUSE REPORT, supra note 20, at 6616).
77 FSIA HOUSE REPORT, supra note 20, at 6616.
78 See DELLAPENNA, supra note 21, at 202-07 (collecting cases). See, e.g., Harris Corp.
v. Nat'l Iranian Radio & Television, 691 F.2d 1344, 1350 (11 th Cir. 1982) (FCN Treaty with
Iran).
79 1992 WL 91914, at *3.
o 965 F.2d at 719-20.
1992 WL 91914 at *3.
82 See 965 F.2d at 719 (quoting relevant language of the FSIA, § 1604).
" This was noted in response to plaintiffs argument that the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (1I), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., U.N. Doc. A1810 (1948), was
such an "agreement." Although the Ninth Circuit said that although an international
agreement did not have to be a "constitutional" treaty, ratified pursuant to article II, section
2 of the Constitution, it still had to be recognized as binding under international law. Since
the Universal Declaration was a General Assembly Resolution, aspirational in character
(despite its status as expressing customary international law), it did not qualify. See 965 F.2d
at 719.
" This is inferred from the Circuit's discussion of the status of the human rights
provisions in the United Nations Charter. See 965 F.2d at 720. Although the doctrine of self-
execution is not mentioned specifically by the court, it seems an obvious corollary to the
remaining points. Intriguingly, the caption of the TVPA indicates that it was legislated "[t]o
carry out the obligations of the United States under the United Nations Charter and other
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"'expressly conflict with the immunity provisions of the FSIA'. '  No
generic human rights instrument will satisfy all four elements of this test.
It is possible that provisions in certain FCN Treaties may, although to date
they have yet to be litigated in an individual liberties context. Likewise, one
can imagine human rights instruments-adopted after 1976 and actually
containing self-executing waivers of sovereign immunity for domestic court
actions-employed under section 1605(a)(1). Again, however, there is no
such agreement which is as explicit in its waiver as the Supreme Court's
decision in Amerada Hess demands.
A second tactic has been the contention that a foreign sovereign's
violation of human rights norms is an implied waiver under § 1605(a)(1).
It was raised in Siderman de Blake,8s where the Ninth Circuit agreed with
plaintiffs' suggestion that there exists a set of peremptory norms of
customary international law to which no derogation is permitted. These are
jus cogens principles.8 7 The court then agreed that the prohibition against
torture is one of these norms."8 But the Ninth Circuit disagreed with
Sidermans' last proposition that the FSIA impliedly waives sovereign
immunity for violations of jus cogens norms, although noting that "as a
matter of international law [it] carries much force." 9  The court fairly
characterized their argument as meaning that "[i]nternational law does not
recognize an act that violates jus cogens as a sovereign act. A state's
violation of the jus cogens norm prohibiting official torture therefore would
not be entitled to the immunity afforded by international law."'  Despite
all of this, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the issue was forcelosed by the
Supreme Court's decision in Amerada Hess.9 The jus cogens claim
likewise failed in Denegri.92
international agreements pertaining to the protection of human rights .... " 106 Stat. 73
(1992).
s 965 F.2d at 720 (quoting Amerada Hess, 488 U.S. at 442).
8 See the extraordinarily full discussion at 965 F.2d at 714-19.
7 Id. at 714-16. See also Comm. of U.S. Citizens in Nic. v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 941
(D.C. Cir. 1988).
n Siderman, 965 F.2d at 716-17.
89 Id. at 718.
90 Id. at 718.
9' Id. at 718-19.
92 See Denegri, 1992 WL 91914 at *3, where the district court noted that "Plaintiffs are
essentially asking the Court to grant FSIA jurisdiction under a novel theory of implied waiver
that has never been before used to deprive a foreign sovereign of immunity.... [While] the
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And, despite an initial success in the district court deciding Princz,93 the
jus cogens theory was given an ignominious burial on appeal before the D.C.
Circuit.' The Circuit focused on the narrow scope that Congress intended
for the implied waiver exception under the FSIA's section 1605(a)(1). "In
sum," the Circuit concluded, "an implied waiver depends upon the foreign
government having at some point indicated its amenability to suit."' This
conclusion drew a sharp and scholarly dissent" from Judge Wald, who
traced the history and nature of jus cogens norms while noting that the
majority's emphasis on the intentionality of a waiver was unsupportable.97
This is not the place to rehearse the arguments for or against adopting a
jus cogens exception.98 Instead, I would like to indicate something that has
gone unnoticed in the law review literature. Even if courts were to adopt
some form of a jus cogens exception to the FSIA, other doctrines of
jurisdictional concern or judicial abstinence might be played to defeat such
claims.
First, one must consider the minimum due process standards under the
U.S. Constitution's Fifth Amendment when either a foreign sovereign or
private individual is a defendant in a case arising under the FSIA. Some
courts have reasoned that since Congress has the power, pursuant to article
Supreme Court in [Amerada Hess] did not discuss the violation of basic human rights as a
waiver of sovereign immunity per se, .. . the opinion explicitly mandates a strict interpreta-
tion of the FSIA's provisions." Id.
"3 The District Court's decision in Princz, 813 F. Supp. 22, is not clear as to its basis for
finding an exception to immunity. Judge Sporkin seems to have indicated that while the
Supreme Court in Amerada Hess rejected a generic FSIA exception for international law
violations, it did not pass on the problem of jus cogens violations. See id at 25-27.
' 26 F.3d at 1173-74. Accord, Smith v. Libya, 886 F. Supp. 306, 315 (E.D.N.Y. 1995)
(adopting the reasoning in Princz).
9' Id at 1174.
96 See id. at 1179-85 (Wald, J., dissenting).
9 See id. at 1184.
"See generally, California Comment, supra note 45; Jordan J. Paust, Document, Draft
Brief Concerning Claims to Foreign Sovereign Immunity and Human Rights: Nonimmunity
for Violations of International Law under the FSIA, 8 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 49, 57-67 (1985);
Danny Abir, Comment, Suing a Foreign Government: A Note on Siderman v. Republic of
Argentina, 15 WHrIER L. REv. 575 (1994); Philippe Lieberman, Comment, Expropriation,
Torture and Jus Cogens under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act: Siderman de Blake v.
Republic of Argentina, 24 INTER-Am. L. REV. 503 (1993).
In view of the Supreme Court's decision in Nelson (see supra note 60 and accompanying
text for the relevant passage of that opinion), the Court will not likely be well-disposed to a
judicially-created jus cogens exception to the FSIA.
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III of the Constitution, to adopt legislation like the FSIA, ATCA and TVPA
(which all require courts to hear cases involving alien parties)," due
process standards are satisfied as long as any legitimate personal jurisdiction
has been exerted over the defendant."' But the better view seems to be
that the FSIA's "long-arm" provisions for service of process °1 cannot
preempt the Constitution's due process requirements. Courts must, therefore,
perform a separate constitutional due process inquiry." To date, courts
have been ambivalent about due process challenges by defendants claiming
an insufficient constitutional nexus between their conduct and the United
States." 3 Most of the jurisprudence in this area concerns the commercial
activity exception to the FSIA °  and its finely articulated bases of contacts
with the United States."1° This case law would not be relevant for human
rights litigation for an implied jus cogens exception under FSIA section
1605(a)(1)." 6
Any victory in winning recognition of ajus cogens exception to the FSIA
may, therefore, be pyrrhic if courts then give more searching review to the
9 See Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480 (1983).
'0 See Paust, supra note 98, at 69. But see Harris Corp. v. Nat'l Iranian Radio &
Television, 691 F.2d 1344, 1352-53 (1 1th Cir. 1982).
101 28 U.S.C. § 1608 (1994).
" See Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Fed. Republic of Nig., 647 F.2d 300, 313-15
(2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1148 (1982). See also Kane, Suing Foreign Sovereigns:
A Procedural Compass, 34 STAN. L. REV. 385, 405 & n.104 (1982); California Comment,
supra note 45, at 407.
103 No court has refused to hear a case in which there was an explicitly available waiver
(usually an arbitration clause) without other contacts to the United States, but several have
raised the possibility. See Proyecfin de Venezuela, S.A. v. Banco Industrial de Venezuela,
760 F.2d 390, 394 (2d Cir. 1985); Wyle v. Bank Melli, 577 F. Supp. 1148, 1157 (N.D. Cal.
1983); Chicago Bridge & Iron Co. v. Iran, 506 F. Supp. 981, 985-87 (N.D. Ill. 1980).
104 See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1994). See also Int'l Hous. Ltd. v. Rafidain Bank Iraq,
893 F.2d 8, 11-14 (2d Cir. 1989).
105 See DELLAPENNA, supra note 21, at 80-95.
'06 See id at 102-03. One recent case suggests, moreover, that a human rights plaintiff
may have difficulty in establishing a constitutional nexus in these cases. The court in
Djordjevich v. Bundesminister Der Finanzen, 827 F. Supp. 814, 818 (D.D.C. 1993), noted in
dicta that proper service of process may not be enough and that a defendant may proffer a
due process challenge. The case did arise under the commercial activity exception, but shared
some features common to human rights litigation.
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defendant's contacts with the United States.' 7 If this more demanding test
was based on a finding of specific jurisdiction-a specific link between the
alleged jus cogens offense and the United States-very few human rights
cases could be heard here."°  Although there does not appear to be a
constitutional bar to applying a theory of general jurisdiction to individual
foreign defendants," 9 the issue remains open as to foreign sovereigns. °
General jurisdiction would require only some link between the defendant
foreign sovereign and the United States, which could be satisfied with a
showing of substantial, continuous and systematic contacts with the forum
unrelated to the cause of action."1 Still, courts must be satisfied that a
foreign sovereign "reasonably anticipate[d] being haled into [a United States]
court,""' and, at a very minimum, the exercise of jurisdiction accords with
"traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.""' Even a strong
hand for general jurisdiction could get bested under this analysis." 4
A trumping riposte thatjus cogens violations trigger universal jurisdiction
may not prevail." 5 Even if Congress does have the power to "define and
punish ... Offenses against the Law of Nations,""' 6 it is not at all clear
whether the courts of the United States may exercise such jurisdiction in
"o It is possible that courts would decide that such an inquiry was not needed since the
jurisdictional basis of the FSIA (implied consent) was premised on the defendant nation's
consent. See Nat'l Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311 (1964).
log See California Comment, supra note 45, at 407-08 & n.233.
'o See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984).
110 The U.S. Supreme Court specifically refused to decide this issue in Verlinden, 461
U.S. at 490 n.15 ("We need not decide whether, by waiving its immunity, a foreign state
could consent to suit based on activities wholly unrelated to the United States.").
". See Olsen by Sheldon v. Gov't of Mex., 729 F.2d 641, 648-49 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 917 (1984). See also Meadows v. Dom. Rep., 628 F. Supp. 599 (N.D. Cal. 1986),
affTd, 817 F.2d 517 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 976 (1987); Rush-Presbyterian-St.
Luke's v. Hellenic Republic, 690 F. Supp. 682 (N.D. Ill. 1988), aft'd, 877 F.2d 574 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 937 (1989), which both held that such contacts as maintenance of
embassies or tourist offices in the United States were sufficient to satisfy rule of general
jurisdiction.
112 World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).
' Int'l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311
U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
114 See Gilson v. Republic of Ir., 682 F.2d 1022, 1028-29 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (finding for
jurisdiction, but relying heavily on domestic due process jurisprudence of personal
jurisdiction).
115 See California Comment, supra note 45, at 409-11; Simon, supra note 11, at 44-48.
116 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
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violation of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment."' And just
because conduct violates a jus cogens norm does not necessarily mean that
it is an offense within the universal jurisdiction of all nations." Lastly,
when Congress adopted the TVPA, it appeared to contemplate that a due
process analysis would still have to be performed under the terms of that
Act." 9 Even if an implied jus cogens exception were adopted, it would
remain to develop a proper approach to satisfy due process concerns in its
application.
A theory of general jurisdiction for foreign sovereigns would certainly be
preferable, but human rights litigators would need to exercise restraint in not
bringing cases where the connections were so tenuous with the United States
that a court, relying on the International Shoe and World-Wide Volkswagen
principles, would dismiss it. As for individuals charged with human rights
abuses, either special or general jurisdiction could be difficult to show. In
any event, such a defendant could not claim the benefit of the FSIA and then
argue that in addition to the proper service of process, a special jurisdictional
nexus had to be formed between the individual, her conduct, and the United
States. Once an individual claims to be acting as an instrumentality of a
foreign sovereign, and that contention is accepted for purposes of triggering
the FSIA, all that should matter is whether there is a link between the
foreign sovereignty and the United States. The only question is whether that
nexus must satisfy general or specific grounds.
"7 For an analogous line of cases, see United States v. Davis, 905 F.2d 245, 248-49 (9th
Cir. 1990), as confirmed and followed in United States v. Aikins, 946 F.2d 608, 613-14 (9th
Cir. 1991); United States v. Rasheed, 802 F. Supp. 312, 316-20 (D. Haw. 1992); United States
v. Juda, 797 F. Supp. 774, 780 (N.D. Cal. 1992), all of which hold that jurisdiction under the
Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act ("MDLEA"), 46 U.S.C. app. § 1903, is subject to the
nexus requirements of the Fifth Amendment.
118 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 69, §§ 423, 702 cmt. n & n.11. But see
Comm. of U.S. Citizens in Nic. v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 941 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (peremptory
[jus cogens] "norms of international law may well have... domestic legal effect... [and]
may well restrain our government in the same way that the Constitution restrains it.").
"9 Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Hearings before the Subcomm. on Immigration
& Refugee Affairs of Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 24-28 (1989)
(prepared statement by David P. Stewart, Assistant Legal Advisor, Department of State), 53
(prepared statement by Michael H. Posner, Executive Director, Lawyers Committee for
Human Rights) [hereinafter "TVPA Hearings"]; 138 Cong. Rec. S2667, S2686 (Mar. 3, 1992)
(statement by Sen. Specter in colloquy with Sen. Grassley) ("[T]he defendant [in a TVPA
action] must have sufficient minimum contacts with the United States.").
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Then there are the related questions of exhaustion of local remedies and
the forum non conveniens doctrine. A human rights action might survive
heightened due process scrutiny, but still run into trouble with these
concerns. The TVPA, for example, establishes its own exhaustion require-
ment. This has been reason enough for some plaintiffs to avoid its
invocation and rely, instead, on the ATCA. 2' If cases are brought within
the ambit of the TVPA, plaintiffs will have to show that they have
"exhausted adequate and available remedies in the place in which the
conduct giving rise to the claim occurred."121 Such an exhaustion require-
ment has been considered an implicit element in some FSIA and
ATCA" claims. By making it express in the TVPA, cases brought under
that Act may end up being bifurcated, with the first phase of the litigation
being devoted to the defendant convincing the court that local remedies
realistically exist in the subject country.' 24
Whether the action is brought under the ATCA, TVPA or FSIA, forum
non conveniens will raise its ugly head."z To date, human rights litigators
have been fortunate; no court has dismissed a case on f.n.c. grounds.12
But as the Filartiga decision suggested, it remains a potent prudential de-
"2 This was arguably the posture in Taye v. Negewo, No. 1:90-cv-2010-GET (Aug. 2,
1993). Whether the TVPA's exhaustion requirement preempts the ATCA (which contains no
such provision) may be decided on appeal in this case.
121 TVPA, § 2(b) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350(2)(b)). See also Paula Rivka Schochet,
Comment, A New Role for an Old Rule: Local Remedies and Expanding Human Rights
Jurisdiction Under the Torture Victim Protection Act, 19 CoLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 223,
251-57 (1987).
'2 See Denegri, 1992 WL 91914 at *3 n.9 (considering, in dicta, whether availability of
remedies in Chile would make the case non-justiciable).
" See Filartiga, 577 F. Supp. 860 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (on remand), where the district court
noted that if an alien claimant does not seek redress within the violating nation because the
damages remedy would be less, the claim might be denied. See id. at 865.
'2 See TVPA SENATE REPORT, supra note 62, at 9-10; TVPA Hearings, supra note 119,
at 14 (statement John 0. McGinnis, Deputy Assistant Attorney General), 28 (statement of
David P. Stewart, Assistant Legal Advisor, Department of State).
'25 For recent jurisprudential reviews of this doctrine, see American Dredging Co. v.
Miller, 114 S. Ct. 981 (1994) (application of the doctrine in admiralty cases); Piper Aircraft
v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981). For specific application of forum non conveniens to the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, see DELLAPENNA, supra note 21, at 134-43.
126 See Marcos (9th Cir.), 862 F.2d at 1361 (upholding district court's ruling thatforum
non conveniens should not be invoked in the case); Marcos (2d Cir.), 806 F.2d at 361 (same
holding); Paul, 812 F. Supp. at 212 (rejecting defendant's arguments of justiciability which
closely paralleled forum non conveniens doctrine).
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fense.l 2  Factors relevant to the dismissal of an action for this reason
include location of the evidence, costs of producing witnesses, the source of
governing law, and injustice to the parties." In human rights litigation,
a significant question will be whether an alternative forum even exists which
can provide justice to the plaintiff. Serious doubts about a foreign court's
impartiality will defeat a motion to dismiss on the grounds of forn non
conveniens.'" Despite these reservations about the doctrine, courts will
remain concerned to give it a fair application. Congress clearly intended this
for the TVPA,"' and it is certainly possible to imagine that in some
instances a court may invoke it to dismiss the litigation, particularly when
the underlying facts of the case have little connection with the United
States. 131
Human rights advocates have been dealt a lousy hand by Amerada Hess
and the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. If the action is brought against
a foreign sovereign, the Act is triggered immediately; if brought against an
individual there is the substantial risk that the defendant could persuade the
court that the FSIA applies to her "official" conduct. At this juncture, the
litigator can throw in his hand or raise the stakes by offering the implied jus
cogens exception to the FSIA. But even if that gambit works, due process
standards, exhaustion, and forum non conveniens could conspire to cheat the
human rights plaintiff of victory. I want to suggest here that, in developing
a jus cogens exception, litigators may expect a backlash of judicial
resistance. Moreover, to the extent that the TVPA codifies or countenances
these prudential grounds for avoiding jurisdiction, it may prove to be a most
unpopular vehicle for redress. The problem, of course, is that courts will
127 See 630 F.2d at 890 (calling the question "critical").
" See Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 257-61; Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508
(1947).
'" See Phoenix Canada Oil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 78 F.R.D. 445 (D. Del. 1978), rev'd in
part on other grounds, 842 F.2d 1466 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 908 & 916 (1988).
See also California Comment, supra note 45, at 406; William F. Webster, Comment, Amerada
Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentine Republic: Denying Sovereign Immunity to Violators of
International Law, 39 HAsTINGs L. J. 1109, 1139-40 (1988).
13 See 138 Cong. Rec. S2667, S2668 (Mar. 3, 1992) (remark of Sen. Specter in colloquy
with Sen. Grassley) ("Nothing in this legislation is intended to or does affect the doctrine of
forum non conveniens, which remains applicable to any lawsuit brought under this act."). See
also TVPA Hearings, supra note 119, at 9 (statement of John 0. McGinnis, Deputy Assistant
Attorney General) (arguing that forum non conveniens doctrine should be retained in TVPA
suits).
13 See Kane, supra note 102, at 411 n.135.
[Vol. 25:255
FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES
likely rule that the TVPA provides the sole means of remedy when the
gravamen of the case is torture or extrajudicial killing. We may all come to
wish that the TVPA had never been enacted."'
As if this were not enough, even if the FSIA is circumvented under these
conditions, a common law residual of foreign sovereign immunity may
remain to bar jurisdiction. This normally should not be an issue, most courts
being in agreement that the FSIA fully codified foreign sovereign immunity
law.'33 Despite some mutterings of the government in Chuidian that such
common law may remain,"3 this has not been widely credited, except for
two distinct circumstances.
The first is for older claims. These raise problems because the FSIA's
"restrictive" theory of foreign sovereign immunity133 has not been deemed
retroactive. Claims arising before the 1950s may be decided on absolute
foreign sovereign immunity theories, and thus be rejected." s Although
most human rights claims would be cut off in any event by some statute of
limitations defense,' this line of cases would have to be reconciled by
those arguing for ajus cogens exception. The cause of action in Princz, for
example, arose from the Nazi atrocities of World War 11.131 Although
Judge Sporkin on the district court did not consider the retroactivity issue,
he implicitly ruled that conduct constituting a jus cogens violation would not
be insulated even under an absolute theory of sovereign immunity. This
132 It has to be acknowledged, of course, that the primary benefit of the TVPA is that it
gives U.S. citizens and residents the right to sue. See TVPA § 2(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1350(2)(a)
(1994).
133 See generally DELLAPENNA, supra note 21, at 8-13. See also FSIA HOUSE REPORT,
supra note 20, at 6606.
" See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text (discussing Chuidian, 912 F.2d at 1102-
03).
135 Prior to the Tate Letter of 1952, a foreign sovereign was absolutely immune from suit
in the courts of the United States. See DELLAPENNA, supra note 21, at 1-8, 347.
" See Carl Marks & Co. v. U.S.S.R., 841 F.2d 26, 27 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 487 U.S.
1219 (1988); Jackson v. P.R.C., 596 F. Supp. 386, 387-89 (N.D. Ala. 1984), affd, 794 F.2d
1490, 1497-99 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 917 (1987); Slade v. Mex., 617 F.
Supp. 351, 356-58 (D.D.C. 1985), affd mem., 790 F.2d 163 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 1032 (1987); Djordjevich, 827 F. Supp. at 816-17. For a criticism of these cases,
see Paust, supra note 98, at 50-57.
.37 See DELLAPENNA, supra note 21, at 340-41.
13 See 813 F. Supp. at 23-25.
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proved to be an untenable holding on appeal. 39 Even if it were clear that
genocide was a jus cogens violation in 1945, it was certainly not apparent
that such conduct would be an exception to a rule of otherwise absolute
sovereign immunity.
A second common law concern is head-of-state immunity, much-litigated
of late. This doctrine has, apparently, withstood codification by the
FSIA,' 4 but has been judicially limited. Paul v. Avril recognized that a
foreign government can waive head-of-state immunity; 141 these same cases
(as well as others) hold that head-of-state immunity is not available for
deposed rulers.1 42 There are also other cases which may be read as giving
substantial deference to Executive branch determinations on this point. 43
In Lafontant v. Aristide, one question raised was whether the defendant, the
exiled President of Haiti, was entitled to head-of-state immunity to claims
brought under the TVPA. The district court concluded that he was. Judge
Weinstein looked to the legislative history of the TVPA indicating a
Congressional intent for the Act not to displace common law principles of
139 Princz, 26 F.3d at 1175-76. The D.C. Circuit was guilty of some circumlocution on
this issue as well. It did not rule that the pre-Tate letter jurisprudence of sovereign immunity
was such as to have cloaked Germany. Instead, the majority ruled that there would have been
no jurisdiction for a district court to have entertained Princz's suit under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331
& 1332. See id. at 1176.
140 See Lafontant, 844 F. Supp. at 129-31. See generally, Jerrold L. Mallory, Comment,
Resolving the Confusion over Head of State Immunity: The Defined Right of Kings, 86
COLUM. L. REv. 169 (1986).
14' 812 F. Supp. at 211. See also In re Grand Jury Proceedings, Doc. No. 700, 817 F.2d
1108, 1111 (4th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Marcos v. United States, 484 U.S. 890 (1987);
Lafontant, 844 F. Supp. 128, 129 (saying that waiver of head-of-state immunity is possible,
but that military junta in Haiti cannot waive immunity of President Aristide, still recognized
by the United States as head-of-state).
142 See Paul, 812 F. Supp. at 211 n.5; In re Doe, 860 F.2d 40, 45 (2d Cir. 1988) (noting
in dicta that there is "respectable authority for denying head-of-state immunity to a former
head-of-state for private or criminal acts in violation of American law."). See also Ex-King
Farouk of Egypt v. Christian Dior, S.A.R.L., 84 Clunet 717 (Cour d'Appel Paris 1957),
reprinted in 24 I.L.R. 228 (1957) (after abdication, monarch is not entitled to head-of-state
immunity).
143 See Lafontant, 844 F. Supp. at 129; United States v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. 1506,
1520-21 (S.D. Fla. 1990); Saltany v. Reagan, 702 F. Supp. 319, 320 (D.D.C. 1988), affd in
part, rev'd in part, 886 F.2d 438 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 932 (1990); Estate




The court in Lafontant said, moreover, that head-of-state immunity was
absolute; it made no difference that the basis of the claim was an extrajudi-
cial killing allegedly ordered by the defendant in his private capacity.' 45
This may run counter to dicta in an earlier Second Circuit decision,"4
relying on a passage in Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon,147 that there is
"respectable authority for denying head-of-state immunity to a former head-
of-state for private or criminal acts in violation of American law."'" The
Marcos cases obviously present the problem of a former head-of-state, whose
immunity has been disclaimed and waived, and who has been sued for
conduct that was arguably private-and criminal. Of course the Ninth
Circuit did not reach this issue in Trajano;49 it reached a happy conclusion
in its denial of individual immunity under the FSIA.'51 Whether head-of-
state immunity is really absolute thus remains to be settled. Distinguishing
private from official acts may be one approach, as suggested by Judge
Weinstein in Lafontant. Or, as the Second Circuit noted in In re Doe,
something more may be needed: an illegal character to the conduct alleged
as the basis of the suit. Even if a jus cogens exception is developed to the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, it will remain important to fashion
arguments debunking human rights defendants' claims to some sui generis,
common law species of absolute immunity.
IV. CUT AND RUN: BEATING THE HOUSE IN HUMAN RIGHTS CASES
With this new deck of cards seemingly stacked against us, how can we
win? The joker in the deck is, obviously, the Supreme Court's 1989
decision in Amerada Hess. If that were overruled, suits could proceed
against foreign sovereigns directly under the ATCA or TVPA without fear
of an immunity bar. With that same stroke, individual defendants would be
'44 See Lafontant, 844 F. Supp. at 131-32 (citing TVPA SENATE REPORT, supra note 62,
at 7-8 and TVPA HousE REPORT, supra note 62, at 5).
141 Judge Weinstein concluded his order by noting that "[wie need not consider whether
an act of President Aristide in ordering the killing would be official or private because he now
enjoys head-of-state immunity." Id at 132.
146 In re Doe, 860 F.2d 40 (2d Cir. 1988).
'4' 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 142-47 (1812).
148 860 F.2d at 45.
149 This was noted in Lafontant, 844 F. Supp. at 132.
"0 See supra notes 47-53 and accompanying text.
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denied the potential cover that the FSIA currently provides. Congress could
have impliedly overruled the Amerada Hess opinion when it crafted the
terms of the TVPA. But by only extending liability to individuals, Congress
showed its disinclination to do so."' So, absent some extraordinary shift
in sentiment on the High Court, we will just have to live with the legacy of
Amerada Hess. Another option would be to do an end-run around the FSIA
by securing judicial recognition of the application of an exception applicable
in human rights litigation. A jus cogens exception, based on the implied
waiver provision of section 1605(a)(1), is surely the best candidate. But I
have stressed here there could be some unintended consequences of such a
strategy.
The next option would be to amend the FSIA itself in order that it could
entertain human rights suits against foreign sovereigns. After the Supreme
Court's decision in Nelson v. Saudi Arabia,152 a number of such amend-
ments have been proposed in Congress. One bill introduced in the 102d
Congress by Congressman Lawrence J. Smith of Florida, 53 although
intended specifically to overrule the result in Nelson,'5 actually had much
broader consequences. That bill would have inserted the terms of the TVPA
into the FSIA as a new exception to foreign sovereign immunity. 55 In
other words, if a claim fell into the ambit of the TVPA, it could be brought
against a foreign sovereign as long as the torturer or extrajudicial killer was
"acting within the scope of his or her office or employment."" The
Smith legislation was favorably reported by the House Judiciary Commit-
tee, 1 57 but killed on the House floor after substantial objection was raised
that it would "not be consistent with the general terms of international law
"' See TVPA § 2(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1350(2)(a) (1994). See also TVPA HOUSE REPORT,
supra note 62, at 4-5; TVPA SENATE REPORT, supra note 62, at 7.
152 See supra notes 9 & 60 and accompanying text.
'5 H.R. 2357, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992) [hereinafter "FSIA AMEND. I'].
154 See H.R. Rep. No. 102-900, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1992) [hereinafter "FSIA AMEND.
I REPORT"].
155 See FSIA AMEND. I, § 1(3), which would have added this language as an extra
exception to FSIA section 1605(a)(7): "Not otherwise encompassed in paragraph (2), in
which monetary damages are sought against a foreign state for personal injury or death of a
United States citizen occurring in such foreign state and caused by the torture or extrajudicial
killing of that citizen by such foreign state or by any official or employee of such foreign
state acting within the scope of his or her office or employment ... ." Id (emphasis added).
156 id
157 See FSIA AMEND. I REPORT, supra note 154, at 1.
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nor with the basic tenets of legal jurisdiction.' ' 58
Similar legislation was introduced in the 103d Congress. In attempting to
answer the criticisms of the first bill's detractors, Congressman Smith offered
to introduce in 1991 a much more circumspect piece of legislation which
would have provided an exception to foreign sovereign immunity only
(a) for tortious acts committed against an American outside
the United States; (b) and caused by employees or agents of
a foreign country or an operation substantially controlled by
a foreign country; and (c) because of employment contracts
made in the United States by the foreign country or its
agents.159
This was much more narrowly-tailored to overturn the result in Nelson,
involving as it (arguably) did torture and detention arising from an
American's employment in a foreign country after recruitment here in the
United States."6 However, this change would not go so far as to provide
relief for the vast class of human rights litigants.
In other bills introduced in the 103d Congress (and likely to be proposed
in the 104th), one bill was simply a resubmission of Congressman Smith's
first exercise. 61 Another piece of legislation,162 introduced by Congress-
men Schumer and Pallone in response to both the Nelson and Princz
cases,163 went one dramatic step further. Although modelled on Represen-
tative Smith's earlier bill, incorporating the terms of the TVPA as an
exception into the FSIA, this legislation's operative terms provided that the
exception would apply to those actions
in which monetary damages are sought against a foreign
state for personal injury or death of a United States citizen
occurring in such foreign state and caused by the torture or
158 Id. at 11 (dissenting views of Judiciary Committee minority).
's See 137 CONG. REC. H3124 (May 15, 1991) (remarks by Rep. Smith).
'6 See 113 S. Ct. at 1474-76.
161 H.R. 934, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (introduced by Rep. Mazzoli). Another bill,
S. 825, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (introduced by Sen. Specter), would create an FSIA
exception for U.S. citizens or residents injured abroad by acts of international terrorism. See
id. § 1(b)(3). See also 139 CONG. REc. 54924 (remarks by Sen. Specter).
162 H.R. 2363, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 1(3) (1993) [hereinafter "FSIA AMEND. II"].
163 See 139 CONG. REC. E1444 (June 9, 1993) (extension of remarks by Rep. Schumer).
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extrajudicial killing of that citizen by such foreign state or
by a war crime committed by the military of such foreign
state or by any official or employee of such foreign state
acting within the scope of his or her office or employment
164
The addition of the provision for war crimes, intended to cover Hugo
Princz's situation, moved this amendment beyond the scope of the TVPA.
It also vastly complicated construction of the clause since it is not at all clear
whether the essential, qualifying language regarding "scope of... office or
employment" modifies either or both the causes of action of torture/
extrajudicial killing and war crimes.
Insinuating the TVPA into the FSIA as an exception to immunity will
require us to again fashion a coherent attribution jurisprudence for human
rights cases. If the FSIA is amended in the ways proposed, foreign
sovereigns will obviously take steps to disclaim the acts of torturers, killers,
and war criminals in their employ. They will maintain that torture and
killing can never be within the "scope of... office or employment." Since
our recent FSIA attribution cases make clear that none of these acts can be
considered "sovereign" for purposes of triggering immunity,'61 it will
remain for the human rights litigant to make some intelligent distinction
here. Having the independent cause of action under the joint FSIA-TVPA
will relieve advocates of resolving the riddle confronted by Judge Kaufman
in Filartiga and Judge Rymer in Trajano: how to satisfy the jurisdictional
predicate of the Alien Tort Statute (an international law violation attributed
to a foreign sovereign) without conceding immunity. Proposals to amend the
FSIA thus offer one real solution to these problems.
This essay has tried not only to explore the nuances of current human
rights practice in our courts, but also to chart the interconnection of the legal
rules bearing on foreign sovereign immunity. Despite the small number of
these principles, their doctrinal combinations and outcomes in practice, as
with a newly-shuffled deck of cards, seems to be endless. Moreover, the
obstacles to a successful result for a human rights plaintiff are formidable.
' FSIA AMEND. II, supra note 162, § 1(3) (emphasis added).
' See supra notes 46-68 and accompanying text.
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We need not only good cards, but winning hands. In my extended metaphor
of lawless villains and devoted enforcers of human rights, we need, most of
all, to avoid the fate of becoming complacent and making the mistake of
drawing aces and eights."s  Our clients have suffered enough without
enduring the legal ignominy of holding the dead man's hand.
166 See How the West was Won-and Lost (Old West chronology), 16 LIFE 8 (Apr. 5,
1993) ("1876: ... James Butler 'Wild Bill' Hickok, a frontier scout and marshal of Abilene,
Kans., shot to death while holding what came to be called the dead man's poker hand-aces
and eights-in a saloon in Deadwood, S. Dak.").
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